American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic
Journals

Scholarship & Research

1981

A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea at the
Federal Level
Jeffrey Lubbers

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Judges Commons

A unified corps of ALJs:
a proposal
to test the idea at the federal level
by Jeffrey S. Lubbers

The

the central figure in formal administrative adjudication. This year 1,119
administrative
judge
(ALJ)
is
ALJs
are employedlaw
by 29
federal
agencies, and they decide more than 250,000 cases
annually. In fact, they outnumber district judges
two to one and they hear many more cases. t
Although almost all the decisions of ALJs are
"initial decisions" subject to review by a board,
commission or agency head, in practice most of
those initial decisions become the final agency
ruling. Thus it is important to understand the
role of ALJs and the operation of the ALJ program on the federal level in order to evaluate the
fairness and efficiency of the administrative
process, and the effectiveness of federal judicial
administration generally.
The federal ALJ program, based on requirements of the 1946 Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), is fairly easy to describe.2 The Office
of Personnel Management (OPM)-formerly
the Civil Service Commission-through its
Office of Administrative Law Judges is exclusively responsible for the initial examination,
certification for selection, and compensation
266
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of ALJs. OPM determines the minimum experience needed to be an ALJ, and OPM conducts
interviews, administers a test of writing ability,
evaluates the experience of applicants and
ranks eligible applicants on one or both of two
registers maintained by OPM-one for those
positions at the GS-15 level (primarily at the
Social Security Administration) and one for
GS-16 level positions.
When an agency needs to appoint an ALJ, it

The opinions of the author in this article are his own; they
have not been reviewed or approved by the Administrative
Conference of the United States or by any of its standing
committees.
1. In FY 1980, for example, Social Security ALJs alone
terminated 252,023 cases whereas all federal district court
judges terminated 192,475 civil and criminal cases. Operational Analysis of the Officeof Hearings and Appeals, SSA
Publication No. 70-031 (September 30, 1981); "Federal
Workload Statistics," Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts (September 30, 1981).
2. For an excellent two-part article on the selection
process, see Mans, Selecting the hidden judiciary: how the
merit process works in choosingadministrative law judges,
63 JUDICATURE 60, 130 (1979). See also Lubbers, Federal
Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on our Invisible
Judiciary,33 AD. L. REV. 109 (1981).
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selects a name from the register of eligibles
using procedures required by statute and OPM
regulation.3 Generally speaking, most ALJs
are recruited from within the government,
often from within the appointing agency,
largely because the salary ceiling for federal
employees makes it difficult to attract experienced private practitioners.4
3. The Administrative Conference has suggested reforms in the selection process: see ACUS Recommendation
69-9, 1 C.F.R. §305.69-9 (1981). OPM is also reviewing its
selection procedures. See Sharon, "Validation of the Administrative Law Judge Examination," Report to the
Office of Personnel Management (June 1980).
4. As of October 1980, a GS-15's salary ranged from
$44,547 to the ceiling of $501 12 and all GS-16s were at the
ceiling. See E.O. 12248, 45 FED. REG. 69,201 (1980).
Few women or members of minority groups are ALJs.
According to the general counsel of OPM, out of 1,127
ALJs, only 43 were women and only 54 were members of
minority groups. Hearingson H.R. 6768 Before the House
Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 6 (1980). There is little doubt that the application of
veterans preference to the hiring of ALJs has retarded the
entry of women into the corps.
In an interview with the author last year, Judge Marvin
Morse, the director of OPM's Office of ALJs and the first
ALJ to serve in that post, said his office is seeking to
increase the percentage of women and minority members
in the corps.

A mere listing of some of the types of matters
acted upon by ALJs shows how important they
are to our daily lives and to the national economy: licensure and route certification of transportation by air, rail, motor vehicle or ship;
licensure of radio and television broadcasting;
establishment of rates for gas, electrical, communication and transportation services; compliance with federal standards relating to interstate trade, labor-management relations, advertising, communications, consumer products,
food and drugs, corporate mergers and antitrust; regulation of health and safety in mining,
transportation and industry; regulation of trading in securities, commodities and futures; adjudication of claims relating to Social Security
benefits, workers' compensation, international
trade and mining; and many other matters.
The ALJ's role in such hearings is basically
the same as that of any other trial judgenamely to administer oaths, issue subpoenas
authorized by law, hold prehearing conferences, take or order the taking of depositions,
question witnesses, vote on procedural motions, regulate the course of the hearing and

ALJs be made into a unified corps- to act as a
separate and independent administrative judiciary-and I suggest that we partially restructure the current system to test the practicality of
such proposals.

In 1946 there
were only 196
federal ALJs;
today there are
over 1000.

A reduced role in regulatory adjudication

make findings of fact and conclusions of law.5
In this article, I briefly document the changing nature of the role of administrative law
judges in the federal administrative process,
and I discuss, in light of this change, concerns
about the independence of ALJs as reflected by
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and
other statutes. Finally, I address proposals that

When the APA was enacted in 1946, there were
196 ALJs, of whom 125 (64 per cent) were
engaged in conducting hearings for agencies
generally considered to be economic regulatory agencies. This year the overall number of
ALJs was 1,119, but only 109 (less than 10 per
cent) were employed by economic regulatory
agencies. By contrast, 695 ALJs are employed
by the Social Security Administration alone,
and another 266 are employed by five laborrelated agencies.
Table 1, which traces this development from
1947 to 1981, shows the almost uninterrupted
growth of the Social Security ALJ corps, engendered largely by hearings under the Medi5. These powers are specified in the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§556(c).

Table 1 Federal ALJs by type of agency (1947-1981)
June
19473
Economic regulatory agencies1
Labor-related
agencies 2

Social Security
Administration
Other agencies
TOTALS

125
(63.8%)

June
19544
165
(59.4%)

July February January January
19625
19746
1979"
19808
221
(44.7%)

157
(14.7%)

142
(12.4%)

109
(9.7%)

35

49

143

210

257

266

(17.6%)

(15.0%)

(18.1%)

(19.6%)

(22.4%)

(23.8%)

13
(6.6%)

20
(7.2%)

164
(33.2%)

431
(54.4%)

660
(61.7%)

698
(60.9%)

695
(62.1%)

44

35

65

43

49

49

(11.7%)

(15.8%)

(7.1%)

(8.2%)

(4.0%)

(4.3%)

(4.4%)

196

278

494

1. CAB, CFTC, CPSC, EPA, FCC, FDA, FERC, FTC,
ICC, ITC, SEC, NRC and predecessor agencies.
2. NLRB, Labor, OSHRC, FMSHRC, FLRA.
3. Mans, "Selecting the hidden judiciary," 63 JUDICATURE 60,64 (1979).
4. Kintner, Doyle, Reynolds and Winnings, "Appointment and Status of Federal Hearing Officers," Report of
Committee on Hearing Officers of the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure (1954), Appendix
D.
5. Lester, "Report on Section II Hearing Examiners,"
Committee on Personnel, Administrative Conference
of the U.S. (1962), p. 25. (Indian Affairs judges not
included.)
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153
(19.3%)

(17.9%)

23

74

June
19819
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792

1070

1146

1119

6. Social Security Administration Subcommittee draft
report to Civil Service Commission Study Committee
for the Effective Utilization of Administrative Law
Judges (La Macchia Report) (1974) Exhibit 2. (Does not
include temporary ALJs.)
7. Mans, "Selecting the hidden judiciary," 63 JUDICATURE 60, 64 (1979).
8."Federal Administrative Law Judge HearingsStatistical Report for 1976-1978," Administrative Conference of the U.S. (1980), p. 21.
9. Table supplied by Office of Administrative Law
Judges, U.S. Office of Personnel Management. See
Table 2 of this article.
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care and Medicaid programs established in the
1960s and the Supplemental Security Income
program in 1972.6 Almost as striking is the
growth in the labor-related agencies, which
now employ nearly a quarter of all ALJs.
Table 1 suggests two trends in administrative law which impel renewed critical examination of the formal agency adjudicative process and the ALJ's role in it. One is the growing
dissatisfication with formal, so-called "trialtype" procedures as a means of resolving the
kinds of "policy" issues that customarily arise
in licensing, merger and other cases involving
economic regulation. Some of these issues are
largely normative, involving a choice from
among several reasonable alternatives. Others
involve risk assessment and making extrapolations or other predictions from frequently imperfect data and scientific knowledge.
More and more, these questions tend to be
taken out of the familiar formal adjudicative
6. The 1972 Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
Amendments to the Social Security Act (Pub. L. 92-603),
occasioned a contentious dispute over whether the hearing
officers for the new program were required to be fully-qualified ALJs or whether they could be HEW staff attorneyclaims examiners. See Federal Administrative Law Judge
Hearings-StatisticalReport for 1976-1978, Administrative Conference of the U.S. (1980) 14-15. Eventually they
were made "temporary ALJs" until 1977 when Congress
made them fully qualified ALJs. Pub. L. 95-216 §371
(1977). Rosenblum, The AdministrativeLaw Judge in the
Administrative Process: Interrelationsof Case Law with
Statutory and Pragmatic Factors in Determining ALl
Roles, printed in Subcomm. on Social Security of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.,
Recent Studies Relevant to the Disability Hearings and
Appeals Crisis, 171, 212-30 (Comm. Print December 20,
1975).
7. See "Avoidance of Evidentiary Hearings in Initial
Licensing Decisions" (draft), Administrative Office of the
U.S. (1981).
8. Senate Committee on Gov't Affairs, Study on Federal Regulation, Vol. IV: DELAY IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS, 95th Cong. Ist Sess. xiii, as cited by Verkuil, The
Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COL.
L. REV. 258, 322 n.326 (1978).
9. See S.262 and H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1980), and H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
10. For example, the number of ALJs at the ICC has
dwindled from 61 in January 1979 to 28 in June 1981,
mostly in response to the deregulation of trucking in 1980.
And if the FCC begins to issue broadcast licenses through
an auction or lottery procedure, an ALJ will not be necessary to take the bids or spin the wheel. See Pub. Law 97-35
§1241,95 STAT. 736 (Aug. 13, 1981) which has authorized
the FCC to "in its discretion grant an application based on
a system of random selection" in radio and television comparative licensing.
Ii. See Federal Administrative Law Judge HearingsStatisticalReport for 1976-1978, supra n. 6, at 230.

process and to be resolved by rulemaking or by
procedural devices such as those instituted by
the Food and Drug Administration and Civil
Aeronautics Board to avoid or restrict the scope
of evidentiary hearings. 7 In 1977, the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee, after a comprehensive study of delay in the administrative
process, approved of the movement away from
formal adjudication in certain types of cases:
Because formal adjudicatory procedures are not
well-suited to certain kinds of cases now handled by
such procedures and unnecessarily delay these cases,
the [APA] should be amended to provide for a modified procedure to govern those cases. Specifically,
the modified procedure should be made applicable
to cases involving market entry and exit, rate regulation, approval of financial transactions and technical decisions.'

The proposed modified procedure called for
legislative-type hearings in which oral arguments and written testimony would be permitted but without cross-examination, followed,
where necessary, by an adjudicative hearing in
which cross-examination would be permitted
to resolve particular factual disputes. This
model likely would reduce (though not eliminate) the need for ALJs in licensing agencies,
since they would presumably only be required
in the adjudicative hearing stage.
Though they continue to receive serious consideration, 9 those proposals to amend the APA
have not been enacted, partly because agencies
have been able to use the existing flexibility in
the Act to develop modified procedures tailored
to their individual needs. And, of course, the
increasing momentum of substantive deregulation has changed the rules in several key agencies-leading to an even more striking reduction in the need for trial-type decisionmaking
as market forces are substituted for regulation. 0
More benefits and enforcement cases
The second trend-the veritable explosion of
benefits cases and of enforcement cases-is just
as dramatic. The great majority of ALJs in the
federal government preside over such cases; Social Security Administration (SSA) ALJs handle over 200,000 cases annually, and Department of Labor ALJs handle several thousand
more benefits cases involving black lung benefits claims and longshoremen's compensation."t Though SSA procedural rules offer the
opportunity for a hearing that has nearly all

the elements of a formal APA hearing, these
cases in practice generally involve short, informal hearings in which the government is
not represented by counsel and the claimant is
often unrepresented. 12
Some have concluded from this, and from the
fact that other disability programs in the United
States and other countries use non-ALJ panels,'" that SSA cases do not require the involvement of fully-qualified ALJs. However, a recent
comprehensive study of the system concluded
that the costs of using ALJs are not prohibitive

in view of the added perceptions of fairness and
the actual informality of the process, as well as
12. See, generally, Mashaw, Goetz, Goodman, Schwartz,
Verkuil and Carrow, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND
APPEALS (1978).
13. The Veterans Administration runs the largest disability program in the country, with three-member nonALJ panels which include a physician. See F. Davis, Judicia l Review of Benefits Decisionsof the Veterans Administration,Administrative Conference of the U.S. (1978).
Many other nations also use multi-member panels and
non-lawyer adjudicators. See Skoler and Weixel, Social
Security Adjudication in Five Nations: Some International Perspectives and Comparisons,33 AD. L. REV. 269
(1981).

The Administrative Conference and ALJs
The Administrative Conference of the United
States, a permanent, independent federal agency, was established in 1968 to recommend improvements in the administrative procedures
that all federal departments and agencies follow.' The Conference, which consists of 91
members,' meets regularly in committees to
develop recommendations, and it takes formal
positions on those proposals in semi-annual
plenary sessions. Since 1968, the Conference
has adopted more than 80 formal recommendations on subjects ranging from the procedures of specific agencies (like the Internal
Revenue Service and the Customs Service) to
topics of interest to many agencies, such as
judicial review of agency action, procedures
for assessing civil money penalties and techniques of notice-and-comment rulemaking 3
When the Conference first began operation
in 1968, it focused strongly upon adjudication
under the Administrative Procedure Act, urging improved agency practices in areas like discovery, the issuing of subpoenas, summary decisions, interlocutory appeals and agency appellate review. Its recommendations thus implicitly
affected the administrative law judge's behavior
in presiding over APA adjudications.
Later, as the new health and safety agencies
began to assert themselves in the 1970s, the
Conference turned more toward procedural
improvements in rulemaking, which had become the federal government's primary policymaking tool. Now, as "regulatory reform"
has become a paramount issue, the administrative law community has begun to pay more
attention to the decisional process and to the
270
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deciders-the more than 1,100 administrative
law judges who rule in enforcement, licensing
and benefits cases every day.
What specifically has the Conference done
in relation to ALJs? Its very first recommendation, in 1968, was intended to improve the adequacy of hearing facilities available for agency
adjudications. It called upon the General Services Administration (GSA) to prepare an
inventory of available federal and non-federal
sites, to acquire and operate multi-agency
hearing rooms in the cities where they are
needed, and to make other reforms.4 Since the
GSA has only partly carried out these responsibilities, the Conference has published its own
Directory of Hearing Facilities(1981).5
Through one of its most popular publica1 5 U.S.C. §§571-576 (1976).
2. The Conference includes a chairman and council
appointed by the President, 44 designees of the principal
federal agencies, and 36 members appointed by the chairman from outside the government. The chairmanship is a
full-time position, but other members serve on a part-time,
uncompensated basis.
3. Conference recommendations are codified in I C.F.R.
Part 305 (1981). For a bibliography of Conference studies,
see 33 AD. L. REv. 235 (1981).
The Office of the Chairman coordinates the research
program, assists in developing recommendations, seeks
the implementation of recommendations by Congress and
the agencies, and actsasa clearinghouseof information to
those interested in administrative law and regulatory
reform. Copies of Conference publications may be obtained fiom the Librarian of the Administrative Conference of the U.S., 2120 L Street, N.W (Suite 500), Washington, D.C. 20037.
4. 1 C.F.R. §305.68-1 (1981).
5. The directory, which covers all 50 states, is designed
to help ALJs schedule hearings at appropriate sites by
describing courtrooms, conference and hearing rooms for
proceedings and by listing persons to contact to reserve
space.
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the costs involved in changing the system. 4
There is little doubt then that the disability
claims hearing process will continue to require
a large number of ALJs.
14. Mashaw, supra'n. 12, at 35-38.
15. There is a trend in recent legislation to authorize
federal agencies to impose civil money penalties through
administrative law judge hearings as opposed to court
collection proceedings. See Diver, The Assessment and
Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by FederalAdministrativeAgencies, 79 COL. L. REv. 1436 (1979). The Administrative Conference has, in general, supported this trend.
See Recommendations 72-6, 79-3, 1 C.F.R. §305.72-6, 79-3
(1981).

tions the Manual for Administrative Law
Judges (1974), the Conference provides practical pointers on all phases of the ALJ's job, an
especially useful service for the newly appointed ALJ. And last summer the Conference
issued a report of caseload and elapsed-time
statistics on formal adjudications in federal
agencies entitled Federal Administrative Law
Judge Hearings-StatisticalReport for 19761978. It describes and provides comparative
statistics for over 170 categories of proceedings
in the 28 federal agencies that employed at least
one full-time ALJ during the three-year period.
Several of the Conference's current research
projects touch upon administrative law judge
issues. In the past few years, for example, several regulatory reform bills introduced in
Congress included proposals to give ALJs
fixed renewable terms-and to assign to the
Administrative Conference the task of administering a system for evaluating individual
ALJ performance. 6 The Conference has never
taken a position on the difficult question
6. See, e.g., S. 262 and HR. 6768,96th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1980).
7. Rosenblum, "Evaluation of Administrative Law
Judges: Aspects of Purpose. Policy and Feasibility" (Second Draft), paper prepared for Administrative Conference
of the U.S. (1981). The study is now being considered by
the Conference's Committee on Agency Organization and
Personnel.
8. Avoidance of EvidentiaryHearingsin InitialLicensing Decisions (Draft) Administrative Conference of the
U.S. (1981).
9. Forthcoming report by Professor Ronald Cass, Boston University School of Law.
10. See the article by Levinson in this issue. His compilations on innovations in state administrative procedure
are on file at the Administrative Conference.

The other maj or growth area is enforcement.
Most of the agencies employing ALJs (including the five labor-related agencies) conduct proceedings to discipline license-holders, revoke
licenses, issue cease-and-desist orders or impose
civil money penalties.15 In these cases-which
likely will increase in number as regulators
concentrate less on developing new regulations and more on enforcing the rules already
on the books-adjudicatory fact-finding and
demeanor evidence are often at the center of the
case, and policy issues absent or submerged.

whether ALJs should be appointed for fixed
terms, and Congress did not enact any of those
proposals. But because the idea of periodic evaluation, whether or not tied to fixed terms, was
gaining wider support, the chairman has commissioned a study of the feasibility of syste7
matic evaluations.
The Conference has also sought to learn
more about the techniques licensing agencies
like the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Food and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency are using to define and narrow the
issues in evidentiary hearings.8 These agencies
have devised "paper hearings," show-cause
orders, summary decision techniques and panel
hearings to handle licensing more expeditiously-all part of a trend away from formal
ALJ hearings in economic regulatory agencies.
The Conference also recently commissioned
a study of the way agencies structure and conduct their review of initial decisions made by
ALJs. There are wide variations among agencies such as final review boards, intermediate
review boards, judicial officers, and panels of
commissioners. The study will delve into issues of organizational structure, status, independence, authority and efficiency. 9
Finally, in recognition of the innovations
taking place on the state level, the Conference
decided to sponsor Professor L. Harold Levinson's study of developments in state hearing
officer programs10 and to co-sponsor with AJS
the ALJ workshop held last spring.
-Jeffrey S. Lubbers

Given the nature of the issues involved (and in
some programs, the high volume of cases), the
ALJ's decision is rarely reversed by the agency
in such cases. Therefore, the ALJ's hearing and
decision are governed by strict procedural safeguards, and the need for an independent factfinder is quite apparent.
It is in these enforcement cases that questions are most often raised about agency ALJs
deciding cases that another arm of their employing agency has initiated.' 6 Paradoxically,
however, the high-volume nature of many of
these benefits and enforcement programs also
puts a premium on quantitative performance
and even facilitates its evaluation, thus leading
to an inevitable clash of independence values
and productivity values
Consider, for example, the recent brouhaha
that developed between the Social Security
ALJs and the management of the SSA's Office
of Hearings and Appeals, resulting in an internecine lawsuit.'7 Among the management initiatives most strenuously opposed by members
of the SSA ALJ corps were a peer review program, a monthly production goal/quota and a
quality assurance program designed to identify ALJs whose decisions deviated significantly from the agency-wide trend. A federal
Appeals Court has ruled that SSA ALJs can
challenge the agency action, and returned the
case to district court for further consideration.

Protecting ALJ independence
The Administrative Procedure Act contains several provisions designed to preserve the independence and impartiality of the ALJ. It limits
the role of the employing agency in the selection and appointment process,' 8 and it requires
that the ALJ (and other agency decisionmakers)
conduct business in an impartial manner.' 9
Moreover, if a party files a disqualification petition against an ALJ in any case, the agency
must determine that issue on the record, as part
of the decision in that case.20 The APA also
prescribes that an ALJ may not be responsible
to, or subject to supervision by, anyone performing investigative or prosecutorial functions for
an agency.2' This "separation of functions"
requirement is designed to prevent the investigative or prosecutorial arm of an agency from
controlling a hearing or influencing the ALJ.
Finally, to ensure that the ALJ is insulated
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Some observers suggest
the quasi-independence
of ALJs should be
transformed into
complete independence.

from improper agency pressure and controls,
the APA contains two other provisions to make
the ALJ more independent of the employing
agency: ALJs are to be assigned to their cases in
rotation so far as practicable, and they may not
perform duties inconsistent with their role as
ALJs. 22 They also receive their pay as pre-

scribed by the Office of Personnel Management, independently of agency recommendations or ratings, 23 and they are removable only
for good cause after a hearing before the Merit
24
Systems Protection Board.
Despite these safeguards, some observers suggest this quasi-independent status of ALJs
16. For example, a major issue in the recent debate over
new fair housing enforcement legislation concerned the
supposed bias inherent in having HUD ALJs hear HUDinvestigated cases. See 38 CONG. QUARTERLY WEEKLY
REPORT 1175 (1980). Alternative enforcement schemes were
proposed, but the legislation failed to pass.
17. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2nd Cir. 1980).
(Upholds standing of SSA ALJ to challenge management's
productivity initiatives). For a full report of this controversy, see Subcommittee on Social Security of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, Social Security Administrative Law Judges: Survey and Issue Paper (Committee
print, 1979).
18. See Scalia, The ALl Fiasco-A Reprise, 47 U. Cui.
L. REV. 57, 59 (1979).
19. 5 U.S.C. §556(b) (1976).
20. Id.
21. 5 U.S.C. §554(d) (1976).
22. 5 U.S.C. §3105 (Supp. 111 1979).
23. 5 U.S.C. §5372 (Supp. 111 1979).
24. 5 U.S.C. §7521 (Supp. 111 1979); 5 C.F.R. §1201.131
(1980), 44 Fed. Reg. 3946, 3953 (1979).
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should be transformed into complete independence. Indeed, Congress has, in several enforcement programs, provided specifically for increased separation of agency prosecuting and
adjudicating functions. In 1947, shortly after
the passage of the APA, Congress passed the
Taft-Hartley Act, which created a strict separation between the NLRB general counsel and
the Board, its staff and its ALJs. 2 5 In other
programs, Congress has gone even further.
Thus, in 1975 Congress established as an independent agency the National Transportation
Safety Board (once part of the Department of
Transportation) to hear challenges brought by
pilots when the FAA issues license denials, suspensions and revocation actions.2 6 It also established the wholly adjudicatory Occupational
25. Act ofJune 23, 1947. See 29 U.S.C. §§153(d), 154

(1976).
26. Pub. L. 93-633 (1975). See 49 U.S.C. §§1422, 1429
(1976).
27. Pub. L. 91-596 (1970); 29 U.S.C. §661 (1976).
28. Pub. L. 95-164 (1977); 30 U.S.C. §823 (Supp. III
1979).
29. See Sullivan, Independent Adjudication and OccupationalSafety and Health Policy:A Test for Administrative Court Theory, 31 AD. L. REV. 177 (1979). See also, e.g.,

Marshall v.Sun Petroleum Products Co., 622 F.2d 1176 (3rd

Cir. 1980) (Secretary of Labor may withdraw from a case
after ALJ decision but before Commission review).

30. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative

Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government
Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1941).
Cited by Scalia, supra n. 18, at 58.

31. Hoover Commission on the Executive Branch of

Government, Legal Services and Procedures 87-88 (1955).
32. Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference,
"Statement and Recommendations to the United States

Civil Service Commission" 12-13 (1973). "Appendix to
Report of the Committee on the Study of the Utilization of
Administrative Law Judges" ("La Macchia Commission

Report"), U.S. Civil Service Commission (1974).
33. La Macchia Commission Report, supra n. 32, at

44-47.
34. Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: Thirty Years
of Progressand the Road Ahead, 62 A.B.A.J. 1,424 (1976).

In a just-published article, two political scientists have
strongly advocated the creation of an administrative court.
Marquardt and Wheat, The Developing Concept of an
Administrative Court, 33 AD. L. REv. 301 (1981).
35. See La Macchia Commission Report, supra n. 32, at
45, indicating that only two agencies expressed approval of
the concept. This may be changing, however. The chairman of the FTC has said that the "idea of assigning administrative responsibility for ALJs to a single entity... merits
further consideration." Testimony of Chairman Michael
Pertschuk, Hearingson AdministrativeLaw Judge System
Before the Subcommittee for Consumers of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1980).
36. Many of these points are derived from the Digest of
Report of Committee on Independent Corps of ALJ (Appendix to La Macchia Commission Report), supra n. 32.

Safety and Health Review Commission 27 in
1970 and Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 2 in 1977 to hear challenges
to civil penalty impositions and abatement
orders issued by the Department of Labor. The
Safety Board and the two Review Commissions
each have a separate corps of ALJs which makes
initial decisions on such challenges, subject to
review by the Board or Commission.
But even as Congress has created these adjudicatory agericies, which act somewhat like
agencies and somewhat like courts (leading to
some knotty procedural problems and turf battles),2 9 it has left unchanged the structure of
older enforcement agencies like the FTC, SEC
and Postal Service. Meanwhile, it has also created new enforcement agencies like the Consumer Product Safety Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and
added new enforcement programs in the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior
and Labor that lack any elements of separation
of prosecutory and adjudicatory functions beyond those specified in the APA.

A unified corps of federal ALJs?
If the current administrative law judge system
appears to be diverse, it is largely the result of
the reactive nature of Congress. Despite this
diversity, or perhaps because of it, there is
renewed interest in the potential for increased
efficiency and fairness in a unified administrative trial court, or at least a centralized corps of
judges to be used by the agencies, but not formally employed or housed by them.
The suggestion that hearing officers be made
a unified corps, appointed and employed by an
authority other than the agencies, is not new. It
was considered and rejected by the study group
that originally proposed the APA in 1941 ;3o it
was proposed by the Hoover Commission Report in 1955;31 it was espoused by the Federal
Administrative Law Judges Conference in
1973;32 it was suggested for study by a federal
advisory committee in 1974;s s and it was advocated by a former ABA president in 1976. s4
Agencies have opposed the idea, fearing that
they will lose the expertise of ALJs assigned to
their agency, delaying and lessening the reliability of initial decisions."5
Proponents of the corps concept point to the
6
following benefits:

The practical problems
of instituting a
centralized corps of
federal ALJs
cannot be ignored.

Operational efficiency would be enhanced
by a corps made up of interchangeable judgs,
who could be assigned to agency cases as the
need arises. Since agency caseloads are not always predictable or within the agency's control, the number of ALJs employed under the
present system by agencies may be too high or
too low.
e Centralized housekeeping and accounting
would save money. Present redundancies in
law libraries, docket clerks, case-tracking systems, administrative assistants, travel arrangements and the reservation of hearing facilities
would be eliminated. And unification would
promote uniformity in the quality of office
space, law clerks and secretarial assistance.
* Public confidence in the impartiality and
independence of ALJs would be enhanced by a
divorce from agency administration. Since
many ALJs were also formerly lawyers for their
agency, since some perquisites of the job (e.g.,
office space, parking privileges and travel to
seminars) remain in agency control, and since
long-term association with one agency's policies and personnel may subtly influence behavior, ALJs may be susceptible to a pro-agency
bias that would be lessened if they were centralized in a separate corps.
* If judges were not attached to agencies,
they would require agencies to articulate their
regulations in clearer language, much as fed7
eral judges often do."
* Individual ALJs would acquire a diversi9
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fied experience and not become stale from repeatedly hearing similar cases. This, apparently, has been a salutary by-product of the existing, but limited, loan program in which OPM
allows understaffed agencies to temporarily borrow the services of willing ALJs from other
agencies.38 This diversity of caseload might also
stimulate the recruitment of new ALJs.
9 Operation of a corps might facilitate performance evaluation of ALJs, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This is obviously a
controversial issue since evaluation of judicial
performance bears such a close relationship to
independence values. But since the agencies
would have a less direct interest in the evaluation of any particular judge, it could probably
be done more objectively.3 9
o Operation of a corps might permit a return
to a multi-level grade system whereby more
routine cases could be handled by lower-level,
less experienced ALJs. Professor Antonin Scalia
has argued that a multi-level system would be
more efficient and would also inject needed
performance incentives into the corps.40
Opposition to the idea
Opponents think the problems and drawbacks
would outweigh any of the advantages, however:
* A unified corps would reduce efficiency,
since it would dilute the expertise that staff
ALJs bring to their agency. Agency statutes,
regulations and precedent can be difficult to
master in a short time, and practitioners would
be forced to educate-and reeducate-ALJs unfamiliar with the particular field of regulation.
e A new bureaucracy would have to be created to train and rotate over 1, 100 judges to 30
agencies for over 200,000 hearings all over the
country.4 If evaluation or promotional responsibilities were also given to the new office,
the director's independence and "clout" would
become a critical concern. The wrong mix
37. Testimony of Judge William Fauver, Hearings,
supra n. 35, at 80-81.
38. See Pfeiffer, Hearing Cases Before Several Agencies
- Odyssey of an AdministrativeLaw Judge, 27 AD. L. REV.
217 (1975); and Scalia, The Hearing Examiner Loan Program, 1971 Duke L.J. 319 (1971).
39. Performance evaluation is a crucial part of the corps
concept as it now operates in New Jersey and Minnesota.
40. Scalia, supra n. 18, at 77-80.
41. Of course, this problem would be eased considerably
if the 695 Social Security Administration ALJs were not
included.

November, 1981

could lead to greater politicalization than critics find in the current program.
* An equitable system for allocating ALJs to
agencies for hearings would have to be devised.
Since judges are not "free goods," perhaps
some sort of "user's fee" would have to be
charged agencies.4 2 Otherwise, agencies might
draw too liberally upon ALJs for non-judicial
functions or reduce their own efforts to settle
cases prior to the hearing stage.
0 The agency's reviewing function might be
altered in unforeseen ways. Some proponents
argue that establishment of a corps should be
linked to a restriction of the agency's ability to
review initial decisions of ALJs1 3 The wisdom
in this is debatable, but without such a change
agencies likely would feel the need to review
more initial decisions more intensively (in
light of their reduced rapport or familiarity
with the judges), leading to an overall lengthening of the decisional process.

A proposal for an experiment
It is not easy to resolve this debate on a theoretical level. That is why the experience of the
pioneering states like New Jersey and Minnesota should be valuable, especially after the
state systems finish their shakedown period
and survive the problems of leadership changes.
Of course, it should be recognized that the lessons learned in these state "laboratories" may
not be so readily transferred to the federal level.
A platoon of 41 New Jersey judges may work
well, but 1,100 federal ALJs may make for an
unmanageable corps. Furthermore, five federal agencies now employ nearly 1,000 ALJs
and the other 24 employing agencies average
fewer than seven judges each. Proponents of
42. Minnesota imposes such charges. See Harves, 65
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43. See testimony of Judge Fauver, supra n. 35, at 79-80.
See also Marquardt and Wheat, supra n. 34, at 312-313.
44. See ACUS Recommendation 69-9, supra n. 3.
45. A study prepared by the Federal Administrative Law
Judges Conference indicates that from 1972 to 1978 about
90 cases per year were handled by "borrowed" judges,
"The Administrative Law Judge Corps of the United
States," (unpublished paper on file at the Administrative
Conference).

46. Testimony of Marvin Morse, Director, OPM's Office
of Administrative Law Judges, Hearings,supra n. 35, at
58. Recent budgetary constraints have eliminated this
"mini-corps." Statement by Judge Morse at meeting of
ACUS Committee on Agency Organization and Personnel, July 15, 1981, and author's telephone interview with a
member of his staff on October 14, 1981.

any reform must bear the burden of attending
to the practical details of its proposed application to such a balkanized judiciary.
In my view there is no reason why administrative law judges, selected on the basis of a
genuine, even if flawed, merit selection program, 44 should not be able to preside over a mix
of cases as varied as federal district or state
court judges, many of whom are selected after
less rigorous review. But the practical problems of instituting a centralized corps on the
federal level cannot be ignored.
A pilot program would be the best way to test
the idea, but it must be broader than the existing loan program, by which underworked
judges are temporarily loaned on an ad hoc
basis (with approval of the Office of Personnel
Management) to understaffed agencies.4 5 OPM
has recently taken this one step further by establishing a very small pool (or "mini-corps") of
three judges who reported to OPM and were
46
assigned to understaffed agencies.
I would like to see a more ambitious experiment involving the creation of a larger pool,
overseen by OPM, to serve most of the smallvolume agencies. The largest agencies would
be excluded from the experiment; thus, the
Social Security Administration, National Labor Relations Board and Labor Department
could retain intact their highly structured systems. The two wholly adjudicatory agencies,
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and Federal Mine Safety Health Review Commission, would be excluded because
they are already functioning as separate trial
courts. And the economic regulatory agencies
(most of which are medium-volume) would
not participate since they must first adjust to
the effects of the deregulation movement, which
is tending to reduce their caseloads while shifting their emphasis toward enforcement and
away from initial licensing. These agencies
would include the ICC, FERC, FCC, FTC,
FMC, SEC and CAB.

Testing the idea
That leaves 17 agencies (see Table 2) with 68
ALJs currently employed-all but three having seven or fewer ALJs. These 17 agencies
conduct a wide variety of proceedings, and
undoubtedly have fluctuating caseloads. If
these 68 ALJs (plus a chief judge, augmented

Table 2 Total federal ALJs by agency
June 1, 19811
Social Security Administration
National Labor Relations Board
Labor, Department of
Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission
Interstate Commerce Commission
Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission
Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission
Coast Guard
Federal Communications Commission
Interior, Department of the
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Trade Commission
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Maritime Commission
Securities and
Exchange Commission
Civil Aeronautics Board
National Transportation
Safety Board
Agriculture, Department of
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Postal Service
National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
Merit Systems Protection Board
International Trade Commission

695
112
82
45
28
23
16
15
13
11
11
10
7
7
7
6
6
5
4
3
3
2
2

Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms
Drug Enforcement Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Housing and Urban Development,
Department of
Maritime Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
TOTAL

1

1
1
1,119

Source: Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S.
Office of Personnel Management. Data does not include loans or unoccupied slots.
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by a few more judges who would also cover
agencies that occasionally need an ALJ,but do
not employ one full-time) were transferred into
a corps under OPM control to service all but
the specifically excluded agencies, the idea
would be put to a good test.
Implementing the idea would require legislative authorization as well as budgetary resources for OPM (presumably to its Office of
ALJs). The experimental program could be
established in OPM for a five-year period, and
it could require all 17 agencies to use ALJs
from this corps (unless OPM granted a waiver
because the agency had shown that the extremely technical nature of its cases requires
in-house judges). After five years, OPM (or
perhaps the Administrative Conference) would
be required to submit to Congress an evaluation of the program.
The administrative efficiencies that the agencies would achieve should mute any opposition from these small-volume agencies, especially since adjudication is not as central to the
missions of most of these agencies as it is to the
others. And any ALJ who balked could transfer
to one of the excluded agencies; presumably an
equivalent number would wish to transfer into
the corps.
It is of course possible to develop scenarios
for a corps encompassing all 1,119 ALJs. For
example, four panels might be created: claims
adjudication, labor relations, non-labor enforcement cases and initial licensing cases
with, say, four grade levels corresponding to
GS-14 through GS-17. Each panel could be
staffed with judges at all four levels. Panel
administrators (GS-18) would then assign cases
to different level judges depending on their
presumed difficulty- though all judges would
have the same degree of independence and
would be deemed legally and constitutionally
qualified to render initial decisions in all cases.
But describing even the skeleton of such a
totally revamped system mainly serves to suggest all the nagging loose ends. What is needed
is some experience to assess. The states are beginning to provide it, the time has come to institute
a pilot program on the federal level, too.
0
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